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Abstract 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has played an important role in restructuring the Korean 
economy over the past three years. Relying upon survey data collected in 1998 and 1999, this 
paper explores the role of the IMF in Korea, as perceived by its citizens. In the eyes of the 
Korean people, the IMF helped their economy to recover from the crisis. However, those 
Koreans who experience a decline in their income, are critical of the IMF intervention in their 
economy. Finally, our analysis of the public attitude data reveals that the pro-IMF orientations 
among the Korean people have little to do with their support for a market-oriented reform 
program. 
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I. Introduction 
The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has served to highlight the fact that the 
IMF can play a far more critical role in dealing with an economic exigency than any other 
international organization. Evaluations of its role in managing economic crises to date have been 
done on three separate levels: by professional economists, the news media, and ordinary 
citizens. Jeffrey Sachs, and many other economists, have generated a large and ever increasing 
body of literature on the IMF intervention in the Asian economic crisis (see Blecker 1999 and 
Naim 2000 for reviews of the relevant literature). The Financial Times, The New York Times, 
The Wall Street Journal, and many other news media, covered the unfolding of the crisis for an 
extended period of time. Average citizens in the many Asian countries have been shown on TV 
protesting against the IMF. Such protests, however, cannot be viewed as wholly reflecting what 
the general population feels about the IMF. Thus far no systematic research has been undertaken 
to analyze public attitudes regarding the role of the IMF in the Asian financial crisis.  
Systematic research on public perceptions of the IMF intervention, however, is essential to 
its effort to rescue any national economic system in a state of crisis. As recent research on 
economic reforms has indicated (Stokes 2001, Williamson 1994), such perceptions constitute a 
powerful force, which can determine the success of a given economic restructuring program. 
Without the proper understanding and support of the people, who experience its painful 
consequences on a daily basis, any one or more of the many parts of the program cannot be 
implemented effectively for any extended period. From the perspective of policymakers 
managing the crisis, therefore, it is important to discern how the IMF is perceived as an agency 
in a position to demand economic reform.  
There is an ongoing public debate about the proper role the IMF should play in managing 
economic crises. Critics argue that the IMF is not really suited to the task of fostering structural 
economic reforms, and that it is constantly over-stepping its mandate (see, for instance, Jeffrey 
Sachs Financial Times December 11 1997, Katz 1998, and Naim 1995). Supporters of IMF 
policies, on the other hand, point out that it has been a positive influence in the recovery of 
many economies in need of fundamental restructuring (see, for instance, Michael Camdessus 
The Washington Post November 10 1998, Fischer 1998, Krueger 1997, and Summers 1998). 
What is entirely missing from this debate, are the perceptions of the IMF held by ordinary 
people directly involved in the process of economic restructuring.  
This paper represents a first endeavor to analyze public perceptions of the IMF role in 
restructuring an economy during and after a crisis. For this analysis, South Korea (hereinafter 
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Korea) was selected for two reasons. Korea is a country that the IMF had to bail out with the 
largest loan package ever, requiring the fundamental restructuring of all major sectors of its 
economy. It is also a country that rapidly and successfully recovered from the Asian financial 
crisis. The survey data assembled for the present analysis came from the Korea Barometer 
surveys that were conducted in 1998 and 1999, the two successive years following the IMF 
bailout in December 1997. These two surveys asked several questions concerning the role of the 
IMF in managing the Korean economic crisis. 
This paper is organized into six sections. In the section immediately following, we examine 
briefly the evolution of the economic crisis in Korea, and we highlight the role of the IMF in 
reforming its economy. With univariate analysis of the Korean survey data, Section Three 
examines whether the Korean people perceived the specified conditions of the IMF bailout as 
having been contributing factors in the worsening of their economic problems. It also examines 
whether they perceived the program to have helped bring about the subsequent recovery of their 
country’s economy. With an ordered logit regression model, Section Four examines which 
segments of the Korean population are relatively favorably oriented towards the IMF. Section 
Five looks critically at the policy issues that are closely linked with the positive assessment of 
the IMF role in the economic recovery. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude. 
 
II. A Brief Account of the Role of the IMF in Restructuring the Korean Economy 
The Korean economic crisis, which lowered its GNP per capita by one-third, from $10,000 
to $6,600 in a single year, was to a large extent a home-grown crisis (Chang 1999, Chang et al. 
1998, Haggard et al. 1999, S.H. Kim 2000, S. Kim 2000, Lee 1998, Mo and Moon 1999a, 
1999b, Moon 1999, I. Shin 2000). It resulted from ill-conceived liberalization, weak financial 
regulation, and poor systems of corporate governance (Mo and Moon 1999a). Under the IMF 
bailout program, much needed financial reforms were instituted along with changes in the 
operations of the chaebols, the most powerful economic institutions in Korea which became 
overburden with high debt ratios and extremely vulnerable to the rapidly changing conditions of 
the international financial markets. The policies chosen to restructure the ailing economy were a 
mix between the economic policy preferences of the Korean government, and conditions 
imposed by the IMF. In general, it is difficult to measure the influence of IMF reforms on the 
economic performance of a country (see Haque and Kahn 1998 for a recent assessment). In the 
case of Korea, however, it may be even more difficult because the IMF changed its conditions 
for economic reform significantly during the course of the first program year (IMF 1999, Lee 
1998).  
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The IMF agreed to provide Korea with financial assistance on November 21, 1997. In this 
regard, it accepted the first “letter of intent” from the Korean government that contained the 
typical IMF conditions in terms of financial sector restructuring, fiscal tightening, capital 
account and trade liberalization, and labor market reforms. It should be noted, however, that a 
dramatic course of events greatly influenced the contents of that program, as evidenced by the 
quickly shifting recommendations to deal with the fiscal deficit. The first “letter of intent” 
recommended a government surplus of 2 percent. The third “letter of intent,” issued on February 
7, 1998, proposed a fiscal deficit of 1 percent. In the fourth “letter,” on May 2nd, the targeted 
deficit was raised to 2 percent, and in the fifth “letter,” on July 24th, it was raised to 5 percent. It 
is debatable now whether these rate changes show the flexibility of the IMF in adjusting to 
rapidly shifting economic situations, or whether it reflects its inability to estimate accurately the 
severity of the Korean crisis (Katz 1999).  
Most economists would agree that the provision of liquidity by the IMF was beneficial, as 
the Korean government had almost no foreign reserves left, while other parts of the reform 
package find less support. In hindsight it is easy to argue that the IMF conditions regarding 
fiscal policy were not appropriate at the beginning of the crisis. It is less clear, however, whether 
this caused any significant damage to the Korean economy. In any case, given the importance of 
liquidity at that time, a fair assessment would probably be that the overall impact of the IMF 
intervention in the Korean economic crisis was positive. 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the Korean crisis can be regarded as a temporary break in 
its overall performance (Lee and Rhee 2000). While growth rates were negative in all quarters of 
1998, they became positive in 1999 and thereafter. The same is true of the inflation rate, which rose to 
over 15 percent in the first quarter of 1998, and then steadily declined. The only indicator that has not 
improved much over the past three years is the unemployment rate, which stayed above its pre-crisis 
level. Lee and Rhee (2000) attributed the quicker recovery in Korea, as compared with the other Asian 
countries, to the high degree of openness and private sector orientation of the Korean economy, 
conditions upon which the IMF insisted. 
 
III. Public Attitudes Toward the IMF 
If it is difficult for economists to assess the role of the IMF in managing the Korean 
economic crisis, how can Koreans perceive and evaluate what it has done for their country’s 
economy? This is an important policy issue that has not received adequate attention in the study 
of the Asian economic crisis. The 1998 and 1999 Korea Barometer surveys asked a number of 
relevant questions that provide a basis for analyzing this issue. Each of these two surveys 
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interviewed about 1,000 voters (20 years old and older) face-to-face, representing the adult 
population in Korea. The sampling and fieldwork procedures employed in these two surveys are 
described in detail in Shin and Rose (1998, 2000).  
Do the Korean people perceive the IMF bailout conditions as one factor that contributed 
most or least to the worsening of the economic problem facing their country? To explore this 
question, respondents to the 1998 Korea Barometer survey were first asked to choose the most 
and second most important factors in all of this, from a list containing the IMF, along with five 
other factors. From the same list, they were asked to name the least and second least important 
factor as well. Table 1 reports the percentages of their responses falling in each of these four 
different response categories, ranging from the most important one to the least important. 
Of the six factors, Koreans perceived the economic troubles of their neighboring countries as 
the most important cause of their economic problems; nearly one-third (30%), the greatest 
proportion, blamed their neighboring countries. This other-nation factor was followed, 
respectively, by American pressure to open their market (28%), and the cozy relationship 
between government and the chaebols (21%). In stark contrast to these factors, the IMF was not 
mentioned at all as the most important cause of the economic downturn, although a substantial 
number (22%) of people viewed it as the second most important cause.  
In the third column (Sum A) of Table 1, we added the percentages referring to the most and 
second most important factors for a summary figure. According to the figures in this column, 
Koreans blamed the cozy relationships between government and the chaebols more than 
anything else. While more than three-quarters (78%) cited this aspect of crony capitalism as one 
of two important factors, one-third or less saw other factors in the same light. In the case of the 
IMF, a little over one-fifth (22%) saw it as an important cause of their economic problems. It 
ranks fourth, right after the American pressure to open their market, and the trouble of the 
neighboring countries. 
What factors contributed least to Korea’s economic problems? In response to this question, 
the Korean people cited democratic regime change most frequently, and government-business 
relationships, least frequently. This finding is quite reassuring for the stability of Korean 
democracy. In the case of the IMF, one-quarter (26%) mentioned it as one of the two least 
contributing influences to the economic problems. As it does on the scale measuring the two 
most important factors of those problems, the IMF ranks fourth on the scale measuring the two 
least important factors. In the last column of Table 1, we estimated the overall level of net 
support for each policy measure by subtracting the sum of “contribute least” ratings (Column 6), 
from that of “contribute most” ratings (Column 3). From this finding it is apparent that the 
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Korean people rank the IMF neither as the most important nor the least important influence on 
their economic problems. 
The 1998 Korea Barometer Survey asked its respondents to choose the two reform measures 
they think would help to overcome the crisis most effectively from a list containing six 
measures, and to also choose the two measures they think would be the least effective. For each 
of these measures, Table 2 provides individual and aggregate percentage ratings. Among 
ordinary Koreans there is a general agreement that the shutting down of indebted banks and 
firms would be the most effective in dealing with the worsening economic situation. In sharp 
contrast, the other five measures were each endorsed by a minority of the Korean people. While 
40 percent cited the provision of governmental subsidies to troubled businesses as one of two 
effective measures, for example, only 5 percent mentioned refusing to implement the conditions 
of the IMF bailout as one of the measures.  
When asked to choose the single least effective of the six measures surveyed, 44 percent of 
the Korean people mentioned the ban on the sales of foreign goods most frequently. When asked 
to choose the two least effective measures, 47 percent also mentioned the same one most 
frequently, and 38 percent the IMF bailout conditions. When these rankings are compared across 
all six reform measures, it is apparent that the Korean people are less supportive of rejecting the 
IMF bailout conditions, than most of the other measures proposed for the tackling of the Korean 
economic crisis. Looking at the net effect of the most and least effective measure, Koreans 
perceive the shutting down of debt-ridden banks and other financial institutions as the most 
effective way of tackling the country’s economic crisis. By contrast, the refusal to honor the 
IMF bailout conditions was perceived as the least effective crisis management strategy. 
In an attempt to evaluate the overall effect of the IMF intervention more directly, the 1998 
and 1999 Korea Barometer surveys asked respondents a straightforward question: “Do you think 
the IMF bailout has helped or hurt our economic recovery?” Table 3 provides, for each survey 
year, the distribution of their responses across five response categories ranging from the most 
positive to the most negative. In 1998, the first year after the outbreak of the economic crisis, 
less than a majority (45%) rated the IMF role in a positive light. In striking contrast, only a small 
minority (11%) rated its role either very negatively or somewhat negatively. Even during the 
period when the economic crisis was deepening, the Korean people as a whole were feeling 
more positively than negatively about the IMF.  
In 1999, the Korean economy’s downturn stopped, and it began to grow again, registering an 
impressive rate of a 10 percent GNP growth, and a 9 percent growth in 2000. As their national 
economy began to improve, the Korean people began to feel more positive about the role of the 
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IMF in the recovery process. A large majority rated the IMF role positively (71%). A very small 
minority rated it negatively (7%). Evidently, the improving condition of the national economy 
motivated many Koreans to shift their views on the IMF to ones more favorable. In summary, 
Koreans do not seem to hold the view that the IMF intervention was counter-productive, as 
Taylor (1998), for instance, has argued.  
 
IV. Explaining the Assessment of the IMF Intervention 
Which segments of the Korean population evaluated the IMF intervention favorably and 
unfavorably? Why do some Koreans believe that the IMF intervention has helped the economic 
recovery, while others do not? These questions will now be addressed with the results of a 
regression analysis. The dependent variable is the question that taps the impact of the IMF 
bailout on the economic recovery (see Table 3). The explanatory variables in the ordered logit 
model comprise the various characteristics of individual respondents. These include: socio-
demographics, economic standing, degree of information, political party identification, and 
willingness to bear the financial burden of economic reforms.  
These blocks of variables have been chosen due to data availability and theoretical interest. 
First, socio-demographic variables reflect other influences on the dependent variable, and they 
can affect the dependent variable directly. For instance, the level of educational attainment can 
influence attitudes on the IMF, as many of its conditions and their economic consequences can 
be understood only with higher levels of knowledge and information.  
Second, the economic resources and position individual respondents command can shape 
such attitudes, because IMF polices have distributional consequences. In particular, the poor 
may have to suffer most, at least over the short-run. Moreover, there might be relative income 
effects. In addition to absolute and relative levels of income, changes in the income level over 
time can also affect respondents’ judgments about the impact of the IMF intervention. In 
addition to these income variables, the status of employment is considered because the 
unemployment rate rose from 2 to 7 percent, in the wake of the economic crisis, and did not 
return to the pre-crisis level.  
Third, as exposure to the relevant information and party identification are known in prior 
research to affect attitudes towards economic reforms (Hayo 1999), these variables are included 
in our analysis as explanatory variables. The willingness to bear the burden of economic 
restructuring, the core of the IMF program, is also included as a regressor because it can orient 
people toward the program itself. Most of these explanatory variables were included only in the 
1998 survey, not in the 1999 one. Therefore, we performed ordered logit regression analysis on 
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the 1998 Korea Barometer survey data. Results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. In 
addition to normal standard errors, we also report robust standard errors (White 1980) to ensure 
that our results are insensitive to deviations from the homoscedasticity assumption. All 
significant coefficients remain significant when applying robust standard errors. 
As estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors in the table indicate, only a few 
explanatory variables in the regression equation are significantly associated with the dependent 
variable evaluating the perceived impact of the IMF on the economic recovery. In the first set of 
demographic variables, none is found statistically significant. In the second set of economic 
variables, it is not the level – absolute or relative – of income that significantly affects the 
evaluation of the overall impact of the IMF intervention on the economic recovery. What really 
matters is its growth, which was computed based on the reported income in 1997 and 1998. 
Regardless of the amount of income they were earning, Koreans, who were able to increase their 
income during the crisis period, felt significantly more positive about the IMF role than those 
who were not.  
By contrast, the Koreans who have a mortgage to pay for a house or apartment felt 
significantly more critical about the IMF than those who did not. The IMF austerity program 
brought about interest rate hikes, which, in turn, increased the burden of a mortgage payment 
(the corporate bond yield of 3 years maturity rose from 13.4% in 1997 to 15.4% in 1998). While 
the interest rate rise was not large in absolute terms, it took place within an environment where 
the collateral value of housing had decreased dramatically, making the borrowing situation for 
many Korean house owners extremely difficult.  
Cognitively, three separate indicators are employed to measure the degree of being informed 
about current events. Of these items, Table 4 shows that those who feel informed about the 
reforms are significantly more in favor of the IMF. Judging from the fact that the size of 
coefficients fluctuates across the three different levels of being informed the relationship 
between these two variables appears to be non-linear. These differences in the size of the 
coefficients, however, are not statistically significant at a 5 percent level. Thus, one has to 
distinguish only two groups: those without any subjective knowledge about the IMF being 
relatively more skeptical of IMF achievements, and those who reported possessing at least a 
minimum amount of information.  
Politically, party identification matters significantly and uniquely in evaluating the IMF role. 
Identifiers with the Grand National Party (hereinafter the GN Party) rated the IMF reforms more 
favorably than all other Koreans with or without a partisan attachment. The GN Party was the 
party in power, when the IMF was called upon to rescue the Korean economy from insolvency. 
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Believing their party was responsible for the IMF intervention, GN Party supporters appear to 
remain favorably oriented to the IMF role in the economic recovery. This finding can be easily 
understood in the context of cognitive consistency. Since they voted for that party, they are 
partially responsible for inviting the IMF, and they rationalize this choice by viewing the 
outcome positively.  
Psychologically, ordinary Koreans are not all equally committed to the restructuring of their 
economy. To differentiate their commitment to this task, the 1998 Korea Barometer survey 
asked its respondents whether they thought economic reforms have to be pursued even if it 
means significant hardship for them. Those who were willing to bear the burden of economic 
restructuring evaluated the IMF involvement more positively than those who were not. 
 
V. Understanding the Implications of IMF Conditions 
The logit analysis of the survey data makes it clear that the willingness to bear the burden of 
economic restructuring. and one’s own sense of being informed about the IMF-initiated reforms, 
have a positive effect on the assessment of the role the IMF played in the economic recovery. A 
crucial issue, however, is whether those in favor of the IMF role actually knew what it stands for 
and represents. As the paragon of the free market economy, the IMF advocates a variety of 
market-based reforms, including those of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization. If the 
IMF reform policy position shapes the assessment of the IMF role, it is reasonable to expect that 
such an assessment is seen as significantly correlated with the views on specific market-oriented 
reform measures.  
The 1999 Korea Barometer survey asked a set of six questions that can help to map out 
different views about how to reform the economy. To analyze this issue, a factor analysis is 
performed on the item assessing the IMF role together with the items tapping support for the 
specific reform measures. Based on the usual eigenvalue criterion, two factors can be extracted. 
The first three variables reported in Table 5 – the laying off of unnecessary workers in the 
private and public sector, and privatization – are easily allocated to Factor 1. Reducing the 
government budget, however, does not load quite as high. Since it gets a negative sign when 
associated with Factor 2, we can also include it into Factor 1. Breaking up the chaebols receives 
a high enough loading on Factor 1, but it also has a relatively high loading on Factor 2. On the 
whole, Factor 1 could be interpreted as “market-oriented” economic reforms. More government 
control over the chaebols, banks and state enterprises is associated with Factor 2. In our view, 
this Factor can be termed “government-oriented” economic reforms.  
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The most notable of these findings is that the IMF assessment loads on Factor 2, the government-
oriented reform approach. In other words, those who think the IMF has made a positive contribution 
to Korea’s recovery tend to support governmental intervention in the economy, not the reform policies 
that comprise the backbone of the IMF market-based reform program. In our view, this finding has 
important policy implications that we explore further in the final section. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper seeks to make a unique contribution to the literature on the Asian economic crises 
by analyzing how ordinary people in Korea perceive and evaluate the IMF role during the 
process of their country’s economic recovery.  The analysis of the Korea Barometer survey data 
collected in 1998 and 1999 has revealed that ordinary Koreans do not put much blame on the 
IMF bailout conditions for the worsening of the economic crisis. Nor do they tend to endorse the 
refusal to implement those conditions as the most effective method of dealing with their 
economic problems. Instead, these Koreans blame their own system of crony capitalism to the 
greatest extent, and they endorse the fixing of the malfunctioning system as the most effective 
solution to their economic problem. 
On the whole, the Korean people remain oriented more favorably than unfavorably toward 
the IMF intervention to manage the economic crisis. With improvement in the economy over the 
years, they have increasingly approved of the IMF’s role as a manager of the crisis. In 
evaluating the role of the IMF, it would be interesting to distinguish between its role as an 
international liquidity provider and a champion of structural reforms, which is not really 
possible given the questions asked in the survey. Arguably, the liquidity provision has very 
much contributed to the quick macroeconomic recovery of the Korean economy, and is reflected 
in the positive public assessment of the IMF.  
In spite of this, critics of the IMF argue that the bailout of countries with large scale credits 
will undermine local incentives to avoid such a crisis, or in other words, that it will create a 
moral hazard. Given the high costs associated with the crisis, it appears unlikely that the 
incentive to avoid such a crisis is low in general. Further, at least in the case of Korea, there is 
another aspect that warrants attention, namely culture restraints. One question of the 1999 
survey asked respondents whether they feel personally ashamed by the economic crisis affecting 
their country. More than 75 percent answered that they feel ashamed, which makes it unlikely 
that political leaders will not do everything that is in their power to avoid a crisis, as the loss in 
voter confidence is likely going to be very large.  
 10
Yet a substantial minority still disapprove of what the IMF has done in their country. 
Arguably, this has more to do with specific micro- and macroeconomic conditions of the bailout 
package than its role as liquidity provider. These Koreans are not low-income people in either 
absolute or relative perspective. They comprise those that have experienced a substantial decline 
in their income in the aftermath of the November 1997 financial crisis. Those who have a home 
mortgage to pay tend to be negative about the IMF intervention. People with a higher degree of 
subjective information about the IMF, on the other hand, are positive in their assessment. 
Supporters of the ruling party, that had to call for the IMF intervention in 1997, also remain 
positive. Understandably, those Koreans who are willing to endure personal hardship for the 
cause of economic restructuring are also among those who give greater credit to the IMF. 
What is especially noteworthy is the finding that Koreans’ approval of the IMF intervention 
is not based on an acceptance of the core principles of market-based economic restructuring as 
advocated by the IMF. This is quite a different concern than the typical critique of the 
inappropriateness of the “Washington consensus” in economic reform (Taylor 1997). In Korea, 
the IMF intervention is seen as most positive by those who believe in the powerful intervention 
of the government in the economy. This finding raises serious concerns for IMF officials and 
domestic policymakers for two reasons.  
First, the IMF has obviously not succeeded in clarifying and publicizing its stance on 
economic reforms very well. This might even be an intentional strategy, as the IMF may seek to 
avoid any policy controversy with unclear messages. Nonetheless, such a strategy is not likely to 
work well as often as is expected. When the situation becomes difficult, for example, people can 
attribute all failures to the IMF because it has refused to specify its policy mandates clearly to 
the general public. Second, in the case of Korea, support for the IMF seems to come from the 
“wrong” group of people. Their misunderstanding will inevitably lead to a clash with true 
believers in the free market economy over the proper goals and means of economic reform. This 
might eventually aggravate the reform process itself. 
Finally, it should be noted that popular support for the IMF conditions is apparently driven 
by the shifting condition of the national economy rather than the specific outcome of the 
particular reform measures that it has pushed. It is not inappropriate for the IMF to receive credit 
for what it has not done. What is problematic for the IMF, though, is that it may be blamed when 
it is not really responsible, particularly at a time when it needs popular support most. 
In conclusion, the IMF has not had to contend with the average citizen in Korea. In the 
future, especially when their economy sours again, there is a possibility for this institution to be 
at odds with those people who misunderstand the true nature of its reform program. To avoid 
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such a conflict, it is highly desirable for the IMF to promote a better understanding of its 
program among ordinary Koreans on its own or in collaboration with the Korean government. 
Koreans should be helped in understanding the IMF intervention in view of the true nature of its 
policies, and not in response to a blurred image. 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1. Perceptions of the Most and Least Contributing Factors to Economic Problems (in %) 
Contributing Contribute most Contribute least Net effect
Factors First Second Sum A First Second Sum B A – B 
Cozy relationship between 
government and the chaebols 
21 57 78 1 3 4 74 
The American pressure to 
open up our market 
28 6 34 5 17 22 12 
Conditions imposed on Korea 
as part of the IMF bailout 
0 22 22 1 25 26 -4 
Economic troubles of 
neighboring Asian countries 
30 0 30 34 0 34 -4 
Japanese banks loaned too 
much to our banks and 
enterprises 
7 1 8 10 21 31 -23 
Replacement of military rule 
by elected governments 
8 1 9 38 13 51 -42 
Don’t know 6 12 18 11 20 31 n.a. 
Source: 1998 Korea Barometer Survey. 
 
  
Table 2. Perceptions of the Most and Least Effective Economic Reform Measures (in %) 
Reform Contribute most Contribute least Net effect
Measures First Second Sum A First Second Sum B A - B 
Closing down debt-ridden 
banks and enterprises 
69 0 69 9 0 9 60 
Providing governmental 
subsidies to troubled business 
6 34 40 10 10 20 20 
Allowing American and other 
foreign companies to buy 
Korean companies 
7 25 32 12 10 22 10 
Forbidding the laying off of 
unnecessary workers 
1 18 19 15 21 36 -17 
Limiting the sale of foreign 
goods in Korea 
10 7 17 44 3 47 -30 
Refusing to implement the 
conditions of the IMF bailout 
0 5 5 2 36 38 -33 
Don’t know 6 11 17 9 19 28 n.a. 
Source: 1998 Korea Barometer Survey. 
 
 
Table 3. The Perceived Impact of the IMF Intervention on the Economic Recovery (in %) 
Response categories 1998 1999 
Helped a lot 5 14 
Helped somewhat 40 57 
Half and half 33 22 
Hurt somewhat 11 6 
Hurt a lot 1 1 
Don’t know 10 0 
Source: 1998 and 1999 Korea Barometer Surveys 
 Table 4. Explaining the Perceived Impact of the IMF Intervention in the Economic Recovery 
(ordered logit model) 
Explanatory 1998 survey 
Variables Coeff.  Std. Err. Robust Std. Err. 
Socio-demographics    
Age 0.040  0.049 0.050 
Age squared -0.0003  0.001 0.001 
Female -0.029  0.208 0.209 
Marital status    
 Single Reference group   
 Married 0.542 0.282 0.315 
 Widowed, divorced, separated 0.566 0.669 0.624 
Education   
 No schooling Reference group   
 Primary school -0.432 0.948 0.811 
 Middle school -0.559 0.944 0.783 
 High school -0.516 0.938 0.769 
 College and higher -0.517 0.947 0.770 
Economic position    
Income per adult household member 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Income quartiles    
 Lowest income quartile Reference group   
 Lower-middle income quartile 0.099 0.274 0.294 
 Upper-middle income quartile 0.470 0.294 0.338 
 Highest income quartile 0.026 0.320 0.355 
Income growth 1997-98 in % 0.008 ** 0.003 0.003 
House ownership    
 Owns no house or apartment Reference group   
 Owns house or apartment  -0.088 0.194 0.208 
 Owns house or apart. with mortgage -0.505 * 0.212 0.227 
 Table 4. continued: 
Labor market status    
 Out of labor force Reference group   
 Unemployed -0.094 0.328 0.361 
 Employed 0.024 0.213 0.208 
Degree of information    
Media news interest 0.046 0.040 0.042 
Political attitudes leader    
 Never asked about politics Reference group   
 Seldom asked about politics 0.606 0.394 0.457 
 Sometimes asked about politics 0.308 0.281 0.303 
 Often asked about politics 0.164 0.297 0.323 
Subjective information about IMF reforms    
 Nothing Reference group   
 A little 1.203 ** 0.468 0.528 
 Some 0.991 * 0.438 0.506 
 A lot 1.299 ** 0.504 0.586 
Political party preference    
 None Reference group   
 National Congress for New Politics 0.042 0.238 0.203 
 Grand National Party 0.598 ** 0.177 0.262 
 Others 0.094 0.279 0.187 
Prepared to take burden of reform 0.431 * 0.180 0.261 
Cases 657 
Log likelihood -728.4 
Chi2-test Chi2(29) = 86.8** 
Pseudo R2 0.06 
Notes: **(*) indicates statistical significance at a 1 (5) percent level. Cut values have been 
omitted.  
 
  
 
Table 5. Factor Analysis of Attitudes toward the IMF Role and Economic Reform Measures 
Survey Items  Factor 1 Factor 2 
Eigenvalues  2.0 1.3 
Explained variance  28% 18% 
 Communalities Loadings Loadings 
Laying off unnecessary workers in the 
public sector 
0.61 0.73 -0.29 
Laying off unnecessary workers in the 
private sector 
0.46 0.68 0.03 
Privatizing state corporations 0.48 0.58 -0.38 
Making the government smaller by 
reducing its budget 
0.32 0.48 -0.29 
Break-up chaebols 0.49 0.52 0.46 
Increasing government control over 
chaebols, banks and state enterprises 
0.52 0.31 0.65 
IMF helped recovery 0.36 0.19 0.57 
Source: 1999 Korea Barometer Survey. 
 
